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F arm bill discussions are be-ginning in earnest, as groups prepare for congressional 
hearings and possible legislative 
action in 2006. A common outcome 
of organized discussions is an ex-
pressed need for a better federal 
safety net for farmers. This out-
come is somewhat surprising in 
light of the existing safety net for 
producers of currently supported 
fi eld crops. As was demonstrated 
in a previous Iowa Ag Review (“Risk 
Free Farming,” Winter 2004), pro-
ducers of program crops who farm 
their own land and successfully 
get their crop into the ground face 
almost no risk that their returns 
over variable costs of production 
will fall below the average returns 
without government support, as 
shown in Figure 1. While the situ-
ation depicted in Figure 1 is not 
directly applicable elsewhere, the 
majority of land-owning producers 
of corn, soybeans, and wheat face 
practically no risk that they will not 
cover their cash production costs. 
So what motivates the widely held 
perception that farmers need an im-
proved safety net?
RISK-FREE FOR WHOM?
The fi nding that the current price 
support and crop insurance pro-
grams greatly reduce fi nancial 
risk only holds for producers who 
do not have annual cash land ex-
penses. A recent survey by Iowa 
State University economist Mike 
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Duffy (“Recent Trends in Farmland 
Ownership”) shows that 74 percent 
of Iowa farmland in 2002 was held 
debt free, so cash outlays for debt 
service do not alone signifi cantly 
increase risk. However, the same 
survey also showed that 60 percent 
of farmland in Iowa is leased. And in 
2002, 70 percent of leased land was 
cash rented. It seems likely that 
both proportions have increased 
since then.
A farmer who cash rents land 
is in a much riskier position than 
a farmer who farms owned land 
debt free. For the renter, land rent 
is a cash-variable expense just as 
real as cash outlays for fertilizer, 
seed, and fuel. The land-owning 
farmer in Figure 1 faces an op-
portunity cost of land—after all, 
the landowner could always lease 
the farm rather than farm it—but 
no cash costs. This allows the 
land-owning farmer to more easily 
survive a revenue shortfall in any 
given year. Figure 2 depicts the risk 
situation for the Figure 1 farmer if 
he cash rented land as opposed to 
owning the land. The level of cash 
rent today with government pro-
grams is approximately $160/acre 
for productive Iowa farmland. The 
expected value of government pay-
ments is approximately $90/acre. 
Thus, if all this value were refl ected 
in land rents, then cash rents would 
fall to $70/acre with the removal of 
government support. As shown, the 
effects of the current safety net are 
quite limited for the land renter. It is 
only the land owner who truly faces 
a “risk-free” condition.
That 60 percent of farmers face 
the risk shown in Figure 2 and 40 
percent face the risk-free situation 
shown in Figure 1 may explain at 
least some of the perception that 
FIGURE 1. EFFECT OF CURRENT FARM SAFETY NET ON RISK FOR AN IOWA CORN 
FARMER WHO FARMS OWNED LAND
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a better farm safety net is needed. 
After all, if non-farming landown-
ers capture most of the benefit 
of farm programs, what is left for 
farm operators?
WHAT ABOUT CROP INSURANCE?
Prevalent farmer dissatisfaction with 
the current crop insurance program 
may be another reason why so many 
people believe we need a better 
safety net. The program would seem 
to run in a manner that is highly 
favorable to farmer interests. Tax-
payers pay for the overhead of the 
program, agent commissions, loss 
adjustment costs, company profi ts, 
and the costs of developing new 
products. And premium subsidies 
mean that farmer-paid premiums do 
not cover even half of the insurance 
indemnities that are paid out. 
But dissatisfaction with the 
program is widespread. There is a 
litany of complaints: premiums are 
too high for the amount of protec-
tion provided; yield guarantees lag 
the amount at risk because they 
do not refl ect current technology; 
farmers who suffer through one or 
more years of poor growing condi-
tions face dramatically lower pro-
tection levels and higher premium 
rates even though the inherent 
risk they face remains unchanged; 
and fi nally, honest farmers suffer 
excessive premium rates because 
program rules are taken advantage 
of by unscrupulous agents and 
farmers. Perhaps no program can 
satisfy all farmers, but the level 
of dissatisfaction with the current 
crop insurance program suggests 
that there may indeed be some-
thing fundamentally wrong.
WHY THE FOCUS ON PRICE?
The last complaint about the current 
federal safety net is that because 
federal farm bill programs focus ex-
clusively on price, payments often 
arrive when farmers do not need 
fi nancial help and may not arrive in 
years when farm income is low. Con-
sider the circumstances of Illinois 
corn farmers this year. Many of them 
will not harvest much of a crop be-
cause of dry weather. The decline in 
this year’s crop prospects has driven 
the price of corn higher, which sug-
gests that farm bill payments for the 
2005 crop may be limited to only 
FIGURE 2. EFFECT OF CURRENT FARM SAFETY NET ON RISK FOR AN IOWA CORN 
FARMER WHO FARMS RENTED LAND
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direct payments. This is in contrast 
to the 2004 bin-busting crop, which 
drove the market price down and 
farm bill payments up, even though 
market income for most corn farm-
ers was quite adequate. 
In the Spring 2005 issue of Iowa 
Ag Review, we argued that the cur-
rent farm bill is “mistargeted” be-
cause low prices, rather than low 
revenue, triggers payments. We of-
fered an alternative revenue-targeted 
program based on the Group Risk 
Income Protection (GRIP) insurance 
plan that would hit a revenue target 
much better than does the current 
program. This result is no surprise: 
if Congress wants to make sure that 
revenue achieves a given level, then 
payments should be triggered when-
ever revenue falls below that level. 
The question is, why does Congress 
target price in the fi rst place? It 
seems to make more sense to target 
revenue rather than price. 
One answer to this puzzle could 
be that it is easier to pass farm leg-
islation that pays out when prices 
are low because low prices affect 
all farmers of a crop. If legislation 
targeted low revenue at the county, 
crop-reporting district, or state level, 
then those producers who farm in 
high-risk areas would receive pay-
ments more frequently than would 
farmers in low-risk areas because 
low yields would drive down rev-
enue more frequently in the high-risk 
areas. This explanation would seem 
to be supported by the frequent 
complaints from Corn Belt farmers 
that their low loss experience in the 
crop insurance program is somehow 
subsidizing the premiums of farmers 
who live in states with frequently 
high loss ratios. If this explanation 
is correct, then Congress might be 
unable to move to a program that 
targets revenue unless the revenue 
targeted is national revenue, in 
which case if any farmer of a crop 
received a payment, then all farmers 
would receive one. Representative 
Charles Stenholm’s Supplemental 
Income Payments for Farmers pro-
posal of 1999 (H.R. 2792) set a prec-
edent for this type of target.
An alternative explanation for 
why Congress targets price is based 
on history. Taking a step back and 
looking at all aspects of the farm 
safety net, one could surmise that 
Congress is indeed attempting to 
hit a revenue target. But instead of 
using one effi cient policy to achieve 
that targeting, it is using three. Com-
modity programs support price. 
Crop insurance supports yields. 
And when disaster strikes, ad hoc 
disaster programs provide addition-
al yield support. Because revenue is 
the product of price and yield, sup-
porting price and yield separately 
does indeed support revenue. 
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, 
Congress repeatedly tried to induce 
farmers to buy more crop insurance. 
Congress knew that higher participa-
tion rates meant that the farm sector 
would be supported whenever low 
yields or low prices occurred. But 
high participation only came about 
with the dramatically increased pre-
mium subsidies. Congress found that 
it could only achieve its goal of an ef-
fective safety net that guards against 
both low prices and low yields by 
turning the crop insurance program 
into an entitlement program that 
provides benefi ts with relatively little 
in co-payments.
TAKING STOCK TODAY
Has Congress largely achieved ef-
fective revenue safety by support-
ing prices with the farm bill and 
supporting yields with the crop 
insurance program? The answer is 
a qualifi ed yes. One of the qualifi ca-
tions is the long list of farmer com-
plaints about the crop insurance 
program previously discussed. The 
other qualifi cation is that the safety 
net is not cost-effective. Why sup-
port price in low-price years without 
accounting for above-average yields? 
And why support yields in low-yield 
years without accounting for the 
benefi ts of high prices? Targeting 
revenue explicitly would be much 
more cost-effective. 
Another redundancy is that most 
farmers now purchase revenue insur-
ance, not yield insurance. In 2004, 
Revenue Assurance and Crop Reve-
nue Coverage, the two most popular 
forms of revenue insurance, covered 
126 million acres of cropland, nearly 
60 percent of all cropland in the crop 
insurance program. This implies that 
farmers can receive both an insur-
ance indemnity and a commodity 
payment to compensate for a drop in 
price. For example, many corn farm-
ers received an insurance indemnity 
for their 2004 crop because of low 
prices. In addition, they received 
a loan defi ciency payment and a 
countercyclical payment. Given that 
taxpayers fund both programs, why 
should farmers receive double com-
pensation for the same drop in price?
Innovations in farm programs 
come about slowly and rarely. When 
the 2002 farm bill was passed, revenue 
insurance was still relatively new and 
most farmers still purchased yield 
insurance. So 2002 farm bill programs 
to support price could largely still be 
thought of as a critical part of a total 
safety net that supported revenue. But 
with most farmers now insuring rev-
enue directly, perhaps Congress will 
rethink its overall approach to sup-
porting farm sector income.
We have previously discussed an 
alternative commodity program that 
would make payments when county 
average yield times season average 
. . . with most farmers 
now insuring revenue              
directly, perhaps Congress 
will rethink its overall          
approach to supporting 
farm sector income.
Continued on page 12
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still see the potential for profi t in 
the ethanol market. In March of 
this year, the Chicago Board of 
Trade began trading ethanol futures 
contracts, providing a fi nancial 
tool to mitigate risk in the ethanol 
industry. While the trading volume 
has been small, the ethanol futures 
price movements have paralleled the 
cash price movements. Over the last 
month, ethanol futures have gone up 
by 30¢ per gallon. The nearby con-
tracts are now trading in the $1.60 
per gallon range, with the end-of-
year contracts priced around $1.50 
per gallon. 
Given the ethanol futures con-
tracts, we have modifi ed our profi t-
ability index for ethanol. Our index 
compares the costs of the inputs 
into ethanol, corn and natural gas, 
to the revenues from ethanol and its 
co-products, such as dried distillers 
grains and solubles (DDGS). The index 
can be thought of as a gross margin 
for ethanol production, the difference 
between per unit revenues and costs 
of ethanol production. The index 
does not imply that all ethanol plants 
will make a profi t, but it does signal 
the potential for profi ts within the 
industry. With current ethanol, corn, 
and natural gas futures prices, we can 
calculate the expected values of the 
profi tability index for ethanol produc-
tion. Based on a dry-mill production 
technique for ethanol, one bushel of 
corn and 165 thousand British ther-
mal units of natural gas are needed to 
create 2.7 gallons of ethanol and 17 
pounds of DDGS. Figure 3 shows the 
historical and projected levels of the 
profi tability index. Given the futures 
prices on July 14, 2005, the profi tabil-
ity index for ethanol in August 2005 
is at 58¢ per gallon of ethanol, mean-
ing the per gallon expected revenues 
from ethanol and DDGS exceed the 
per gallon expected costs of corn and 
natural gas by 58¢. But the futures 
prices show a downward trend in 
ethanol prices and upward trends 
in corn and natural gas prices. For 
December 2005, the index is down to 
33¢ per gallon. It is still positive, re-
fl ecting the possibility of profi ts in the 
industry, but highlights the expected 
tightening in the ethanol market.
Over the last 15 months the 
ethanol industry has gone through 
a volatile period. The industry has 
experienced signifi cant growth and 
dramatic price swings. Given the 
planned expansions in ethanol plant 
capacities and a renewed effort by 
Congress to pass an energy bill, the 
ethanol industry is looking to con-
tinue its growth, but until the de-
mand and infrastructure for ethanol 
mature, we can expect to see more 
dramatic price swings in ethanol’s 
future that are not necessarily re-
lated to events in oil markets. ◆
FIGURE 3. HISTORICAL AND PROJECTED ETHANOL GROSS MARGINS
Ethanol Revisited
Continued from page 7
beef markets. Mexico has become 
and will remain the largest market 
for U.S. beef and beef variety meats 
for some time. To balance demand 
for the types and cuts of beef the 
U.S. industry produces, the United 
States will face an uphill battle in 
recapturing market share in other 
countries, especially in high-value 
markets that have been highly re-
sistant to accepting U.S. beef. Once 
Japan reopens to U.S. beef, that 
country’s beef safeguard mecha-
nism is likely to hamper these ef-
forts because of lower quarterly 
trigger levels. And, closing the bor-
der to Canadian live cattle has exac-
erbated these challenges because 
the United States will face Canada’s 
increased ability to place high-qual-
ity beef into world markets. ◆
A New World Market for U.S. Beef
Continued from page 5
 
 
